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T

he satellite gap between America and every other nation in the world is universally recognized, and the significance of this fact is also unquestioned. America’s unparalleled investment in space, in satellites, the infrastructure that goes with
them and the precision weapons that best exploit them is appreciated as having made
possible its successful campaigns against Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan.
If anything, the gap seems certain to grow steadily greater in the coming
years. In the three years between Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, American airpower
went from being effective principally against fixed targets like infrastructure to routinely devastating moving formations using real-time intelligence with the help of
faster satellite relays. The Army and Navy as well as the Air Force have been
directed to devote increasing attention to space, specifically to “establish requirements, maintain a cadre of space-qualified officers, and research, develop, acquire,
and deploy space systems unique to each service.”1 The United States is even slated
to begin testing space-based weapons, starting with space-based interceptor missiles in 2006. The implicit technical possibilities have compelled some to envision
the United States going even further and seizing outright the highest ground of all
(happily unoccupied by anyone else) to impose a Wilsonian international order on
the planet. With an invincible space force keeping the peace between nations, war as
it has traditionally been known theoretically becomes impossible.
On paper, the scenario (no longer limited to government reports, think
tanks, and military and policy journals, but increasingly appearing in mainstream
magazines like last April’s issue of Wired 2 ) looks like a masterstroke, a geopolitical checkmate against all future aggression. While some acknowledgment is
given to the fact that satellites are not invulnerable, the thornier problems and profound limitations of an “astrocop” system rarely get the consideration they require.
In particular this sort of thinking about space power takes four dangerous myths
for granted.
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Myth #1: America’s capacity to exploit space and deny
its use to opponents will be virtually unquestioned.
At first glance this proposition appears to be true, as the United States has
no large peer competitors, actual or even potential. China’s military remains one to
two generations behind the United States technologically.3 Russia continues to
possess the infrastructure for mounting a challenge to the United States, but is
likely to remain cash-strapped for a long time to come.4 Japan’s stagnating economic growth and reluctance to increase its military expenditures makes its rise as
a space power unlikely. Western Europe has yet to develop a coherent defense and
foreign policy, and is slowed further by its skepticism about information warfare.5
In the meantime, European militaries are falling technologically behind the United
States to such a degree that the interoperability of NATO forces seems threatened.6
While the satellite gap may now appear to be unbridgeable, the wide array
of communications, navigation, reconnaissance, and weather satellite services commercially available means that other states can meet much of their need for space
power in the marketplace. The imagery offered by the French Systeme Pour
l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT) corporation is good enough that the United States
relied heavily on it in the Gulf and Kosovo and has developed the Eagle Eye Vision
program to facilitate its use.7 Militaries that can not afford communications satellites
of their own can lease transponders on the satellites orbited by other countries, and
some—like Australia—have already done so. Navigation aids like the Global Positioning System can be used by anyone with a cheap receiver. The commercialization
of space is also likely to progress even more rapidly over the coming years.8
Given the usually civilian character of such services, it may be more politically difficult to cut off their signals or attack them outright than would be the
case with dedicated military satellites. Attacking a commercially owned satellite,
even one which is partially leased to or providing information to a belligerent’s
military, would be broadly equivalent to attacking neutral shipping in wartime. A
conflict in which this became a regular practice would be comparable to the unrestricted submarine warfare of the world wars.9 (It also would represent a practical
inconvenience for the United States given the reliance of its economy and military
on commercial services.) The number of such services available may offer such redundancy as to make it impossible to totally deny a sophisticated enemy access,
even after it has executed its initial strike.
The declining price and widening availability of satellite construction
and space launch capabilities suggest that more states will be able to establish a
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presence in space, increasing their redundancy. Over earlier US objections, the
European Union is pressing ahead with its Galileo project with the help of Canadian and Russian finance and expertise.10 (Unlike the Global Positioning System,
Galileo is a civil project funded from mainly private sources.) Russia has the
Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). China is pursuing its own
equivalent in the Beidou system. Japan is launching its first constellation of reconnaissance satellites over the next few years. There is also a widespread interest in missile defense not only on the part of major states like those just
mentioned but also in small countries like Israel and Taiwan which could lead to
their pursuing greater space capabilities.
Moreover, America’s technical lead could be rendered less important
even where it does not shrink. America’s advantage over Iraq and Yugoslavia
was that it was an information-age power fighting an industrial-age power, and
the disparity between two information-age powers is likely to be less significant
than that. The theft or import of technology may be no substitute for homegrown
research and development, but a cheap knock-off may in some cases be good
enough to get the job done. This is especially so if the knock-off can be produced
in large numbers. The dual-use character of so much space technology and the
fact that others are likely to be able to imaginatively combine various technologies, improvise, adapt, and even innovate mean it can not be assumed that other
states will always field inferior systems.11
Finally, it has been widely acknowledged that a power disadvantaged in
satellites and space-based weapons could use a variety of cheaper weapons and
tactics to reduce American space superiority. High-flying drones can provide a
partial substitute for a shortage of adequate satellites, at least regionally. Such a
capability may be less extensive, secure, or reliable in particular respects than
what the United States possesses, but it will be there nonetheless.
At the same time, low-budget powers can use a variety of techniques to
attack American satellites, including hacker warfare or earth-based laser weapons which will have advantages over the space-based variety. Earth-based weapons do not have to be as compact as systems launched into space, and thus they
can be built by a less-sophisticated enemy. They can be deployed more cheaply,
without the infrastructure required for space launch and ground control. The
communications links on which they depend are less susceptible to disruption,
and they are much more accessible to those whose job it is to maintain and resupply them. The same goes for directed-energy weapons based on ships or inside
wide-bodied aircraft, which may also have the capacity to attack US satellitebased systems.12
Consequently, while no other power can match the United States satellite for satellite, states can have many of the benefits of a space infrastructure
without launching a single satellite of their own. The availability of so many
services on the market also reduces the number of systems they need to build
themselves, compensating for economic or technological disadvantages. An op126
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ponent capable of launching a limited satellite network of its own, supplementing it with drones and commercially available data, and able to make life harder
for the United States by knocking out some of its own satellites is certainly conceivable over the next quarter-century. Like the German navy before World
War I or the Soviet navy in the Cold War, it would be a “risk fleet.” It is also conceivable that a number of states with limited space capabilities could come together in an attempt to counterbalance the United States. Even without any such
opponents appearing, the United States may have to accept that sophisticated opponents in the future will have at least a limited ability to deny space to the United
States and to exploit space for their own ends throughout a conflict.

Myth #2: Other states cannot neutralize American
space power without directly attacking its space assets.
While space power is crucial to the unprecedented military capability the
United States now enjoys, the space-based infrastructure is its nervous system.
The muscle is in its air, land, and sea forces, and will remain there for many decades to come. Supporting those forces is the first mission of the military space
program.13 Nonetheless, the tail in space counts for little if the planetary teeth can
be neutralized. Some of the ways in which potential adversaries can go about doing
this are reasonably obvious, such as the construction of facilities underground, the
targeting of ground control and downlink stations, or the use of electronic warfare
to cut off American military forces from their supporting space assets. However,
they also can fight American forces in ways which diminish the value of their presently unmatched capacity to monitor the battlespace and strike with precision.
One way is through special forces actions. Given the growing power of
small groups of people to inflict destruction, states may turn to developing massive special operations forces for spreading chaos behind an enemy’s lines. The
Soviet Union had a force of 25,000 Spetsnaz troops who would have been unleashed en masse against Western targets from communications and transport
systems to nuclear weapons facilities in the event of a third world war.14 North
Korea has over 100,000 soldiers in its own special forces units, presumably intended to wreak havoc behind South Korean lines in a future conflict.15 It goes
without saying that the chaos created by the most destructive attack a terrorist
group like al Qaeda could stage pales compared to what such robust forces could
accomplish given the chance.
A second method is to emphasize submarine forces. The undersea world
remains impervious to aerospace surveillance, the sea surface presenting a barrier
that cleaves the battlespace in two. Short of a breakthrough in non-acoustic submarine detection, space power will be incapable of defeating submarines. The result
is that the submarine, once it has been deployed, may retain much of its ability to
attack ships and even fire missiles at targets inland. Consequently, powers seeking
to challenge US space power could concede superiority on the surface to the Americans, build up their submarine force, and unleash it on shipping lanes and coastSpring 2003
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lines much as Germany did in the world wars. The advent of underwater “arsenal
ships,” supercavitating cruise missiles that will minimize flight times by “popping
up” out of the water near their targets, and facilities and weapons based on the seabed will only enhance such prospects.
A third way is to create air defense systems capable of neutralizing aerospace power and particularly precision-guided munitions. A system capable of reliably stopping a ballistic missile is likely to be that much more capable against
conventional aircraft. Network-centric air defenses linking multiple launchers to
multiple sensors will be much more difficult to suppress. Directed-energy weapons also hold out the possibility that even when aircraft cannot be shot down, the
munitions they deliver can be destroyed before landing. The Tactical High Energy
Laser is intended to shoot down not ballistic missiles but low-cost air threats like
Katyusha artillery rockets or, conceivably, bombs, shells, and tactical missiles.
Directed-energy weapons will force munitions to become stealthier and
perhaps better protected against directed-energy attacks by being bigger, heavier,
or armored. This will drive up the cost of individual units and the number of them
that have to be used to achieve a particular effect. If a defense system could stop 95
percent of the bombs or shells fired or dropped on it, 20 or more bombs or shells
would have to be allowed for every target. This would dramatically reduce the
economy of even a munition accurate enough to approach the ideal of “one-shot,
one-kill” and help render the smart bomb senile.
It may appear that the deployment of weapons in space is a solution to
this problem. However, it is one thing to launch space-based laser weapons capable of defeating a limited ballistic missile attack or crippling a satellite and quite
another to launch into orbit the firepower necessary to destroy an army on the
ground. Since laser weapons may be inherently inefficient, missiles will likely
have to deliver the bulk of the firepower, and the same goes for earth-based laser
weapons.16 Additionally, the difficulties inherent in ballistic missile defense (like
the absence of a margin for failure) suggest that the space-based weapons likely to
be deployed in the foreseeable future will be dedicated strictly to strategic defense
while more economical methods are used to attack conventional forces.
A fourth method is to recognize that precision is not “a straightforward
substitute for mass or attrition” and again to look to the latter as a way of defeating the former.17 It has been suggested that countries like Russia or China could
respond to the creation of a National Missile Defense by building more missiles,
outfitting their missiles with multiple warheads, or equipping their missiles with
decoys or other countermeasures to confuse fire control systems. This can also be
done with conventional weapon systems. The proliferation of unmanned vehicles on land, sea, and in the air, of stealthy materials and designs, and incorporating the “net-centricity” of future warfare, could make the generation of an
overwhelming number of targets more feasible. A net-centric tank like the US
Army’s Future Combat System will consist of a system-of-systems, several vehicles where there used to be only one. If these vehicles are also stealthy in design,
128
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protected by active and passive countermeasures, and carefully coordinated to
maximize their rate of advance and minimize their vulnerability to air attack, the
challenge to air power will increase accordingly. More munitions will have to be
expended to hit each target, and more targets attacked—so many more that they
could overwhelm the ability of air power to halt their advance. The same could
perhaps be said of an air force employing vast numbers of small, cheap, stealthy,
drone aircraft or naval vessels. Swarms of attack microbots or nanobots would allow this approach to be taken to an extreme.
Singly these approaches may not be enough to change the balance of
power, but a sophisticated enemy is likely to employ them in combination while
enjoying some use of space and some ability to deny its use to American forces.
Particularly in a localized or limited conflict, this could be enough to substantially
narrow the gap between the United States and its future foes. Conventional land
and sea battles of some sort will therefore remain at least technically possible.

Myth #3: America’s assumption of the role of dominant
space power can end armed conflict between states.
A common feature of scenarios built around the “omniscient, unobstructed lethality” of an “astrocop” system is that it will stop any tank, plane, or
missile from crossing borders, effectively ending interstate war. Unfortunately,
such a plan assumes a billiard-ball model of international relations in which
states are unitary, self-contained actors, an idea which appears increasingly
quaint. (The proponents of such a system, after all, often claim that interstate war
is largely a thing of the past, which raises the problem that this enormous investment is being justified through reference to a problem that is supposed to have already disappeared.)
Most of the conventional conflicts where such weapons may be effective are civil wars which spill across borders, involving neighboring states. A
better question than “How will the United States manage interstate wars?” may
be “How will the United States manage intrastate wars?” and few have had much
to say on that score. The reality is that as in the Cold War, internal and interstate
conflicts are likely to feed off each other. American control of space will not in
and of itself prevent antagonisms between states from finding their expression in
proxy wars. At the same time, internal conflicts can complicate American relations with other great powers because these do have geopolitical significance,
and because they often occur along ethnic lines. If Samuel Huntington’s “clash of
civilizations” thesis was an overstatement, it was nonetheless a factor in Russian
hostility toward NATO action in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.18
Even assuming that America’s role as global policeman could somehow remain limited to border security, the fact remains that the delineation of
borders is not always clear. An American commitment to guarding the borders of
all nations means that the United States will take a position on every border dispute. The problem is even greater on the oceans, where disputes could sharpen as
Spring 2003
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the seas are “territorialized.” Already fishermen and oil drillers are routinely
charged with violating the claims of other countries, and littoral navies have repeatedly clashed over the delineation of claims in the South China Sea. Will the
protection of borders include the use of force to keep fishermen from one country
from poaching inside another state’s claim? Such a policy would imply a remarkable and unprecedented expansion of American responsibility. Matters also are
likely to become worse as new ways are found to exploit the seas, from power
generation to ocean mining to cheap desalinization.
There is also little reason to believe that American space power will
eliminate the conflicts that produce wars any more than British sea power did, let
alone abolish realpolitik. If anything, the extension of American space power
could heighten realpolitik by exacerbating the anxieties of countries like Russia
and China, which already have paid more than lip service to counterbalancing
American power.
Whatever their ability to do so in the immediate future, history suggests
that other states will not accept American dominance of space indefinitely any
more than Britain’s dominion over the seas was tolerated indefinitely. As the rising power in Europe in the late 19th-century, Germany had by the 1890s turned to
building a fleet of its own, initiating a naval arms race that contributed to the outbreak of World War I. While Germany did not win that conflict, it is worth remembering that while the German High Seas Fleet lost strategically at Jutland, it
took the tactical honors. German U-boats, “bypassing” Britain’s superiority on
the surface to strike at its shipping, nearly brought Britain to its knees. The pursuit of multiple satellite navigation systems, for instance, is partly a response to
the control of the Global Positioning System by the US military. Such challenges
could grow more frequent and bolder in the years to come.

Myth #4: The threats to American security which space power
does not similarly eliminate can be regarded as lesser dangers.
Some might have us believe that American space dominance would
eliminate the entire spectrum of warfare between Intifada and Armageddon by
leaving potential adversaries hopelessly outmatched. But even if that fantasy
were so, if conventional warfare ceased to be a consideration, such a situation
would nonetheless present a return to brinkmanship against not one but several
different enemies.
Recent work on the study of deterrence suggests that the limitations of
deterrence will be more pronounced in the future, in single situations and perhaps
generally. Deterrence must not only be seen as credible, but as speaking to the values of an enemy both willing and able to change his course of action, something
that may be less likely in dealings with rogue states than it was with the Soviet Union.19 The reality is also that other states will use their nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction to deter American action, as well as be deterred by the United
States, and they may be able to do this with fewer resources than is generally appre130
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ciated. An enemy which sneaks its nukes into the United States rather than lobbing
them across the ocean atop an ICBM (which may now be the more plausible threat)
simplifies the problem of its acquiring a delivery system and bypasses missile and
other conventional defenses.20 It also sows confusion as to the origin of the attack,
which is perhaps its best hope for warding off a devastating counterattack.
The threats of Intifada and Armageddon also become the same threat
when terrorists possess weapons of mass destruction. As 11 September 2001 reminded the world, large-scale terror is a very real danger, and in addition to the
other problems they pose (from threats to investment to refugee flows) failed states
are increasingly seen as sanctuaries for those who would commit such acts. The
United States is incapable of single-handedly eliminating the problem of failed
states. Indeed, managing that problem is not something that can be accomplished
solely through military instruments, since the main effort has to be preventative.21
When the time comes for military action, the real test is less whether planes can
smart-bomb bandits than whether ground troops can keep the peace.
In fact it is possible that an extension of space power would diminish
America’s ability to deal with these other problems. One way would be through the
fostering of a false sense of invulnerability: the perception will be that the United
States can neglect very real problems because it has its fortress in the sky. The sense
that wars can be won swiftly from the air will enhance this by reducing the tolerance
for more protracted operations, especially when they incur casualties: the success of
Desert Storm made Somalia’s costs appear all the more unacceptable.
Another way in which a drastically enlarged investment in space-based
assets could weaken American power is through the diminution of its resources.
It would mean less money for other functions and missions like intelligencegathering or peacekeeping, let alone attempts to attack the economic and ecological roots of many present and future conflicts.22 The hostility with which other
states could greet American space dominance may also lessen American influence
abroad, making it more difficult to jointly tackle with other states problems like the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Conclusion
Space is not a substitute for all forms of military capability nor for the
economic, diplomatic, and political power on which not only American security
in general but space power specifically depends. To that end there should be a
greater wariness of further militarizing space, not only because of the political
and military risks it entails or the ethical questions it raises, but because it may be
a case where “increases in complexity provide diminishing returns.”
Moreover, security is not the sole consideration of American space policy. Weather monitoring, earth surveillance, scientific research, current navigational techniques, and the telecommunications that have made the modern
economy possible depend heavily on a growing infrastructure in space—one
which will become only more important over time. While this raises questions
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about the ability to protect this infrastructure, turning space from a conduit of information into a scene of active conflict may do more harm than good. Given the
serious limitations of space power, America’s lead in space may be best used to
prevent or at least slow the further militarization of space.23 The Clausewitzian
reasoning remains as valid today as ever: war is a political act. Military policy
should therefore be directed by rational political ends, not by the outer limits of
what appears to be technically possible.
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